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The object of this paper will be to give a brief
summary of the legislaLion of Congress affecting the Mor-
mon people,with the principal cases arising under these
laws and the important constitutional questions involved.
Perhaps no epoch in the history of our jurisprudence
more forcibly illustrates the might and majesty of the
law-certainly no similarand possibly no more remarkable
conditions have ever been the subject of its operation.
It is safe to say that the history of no country furnish-
es such an example of complete revolution in the social
conditions of any sect. The practice which this legisla-
tion was designed to prevent was only participated in by,
a comparatively small portion of the Mormon people,and
they acted under a claim of religious right,but the oper-
ation of the law.r has been so~farreaching as to affect thi,_
entire people.
Can anything be more anomulous than to see men who
have been convicted of crimeconfined in state's prison,
with hair shorn and arrayed in convict's garb,emerging
from their prison cells at the expiration of their terma
of sentence and taken by the hand by the most prominent
and influential membei-sbf the conmmunitywho sustain them
in positions of responsibilty ad trust,where they re-
ceive the confidence of all classes of peoplJ. Hundreds
of such cases have occurred in Utahbut the operation of
the law has bserl most effective and complete.
On account of the peculiar social conditions 2xist-
in Utahin the year 18P2 Congress passed "An act to pun-
ish and prevent the practice of polygamy in the Territo-
ries and other places and disapproving and annulling cer-
tain acts of the legislative assembly of the Territory of
Utah",which in addition to making polyamyv a crime and
prescribing a penalty therefor,liimited the capacity of
religious and charitable corporations and associations to
hold real property to the amount of Fifty Thousand Dol-
lars.
This act remained a dead letter on the statute book
until the year 1878,when George Reynolds .,ias convicted of
polygamy in the Third District Court of Utah. The judg-
ment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory
and the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States;the prisoner claiming that the legislation under
which he vwas convicted -ras in violation of the first a-
mendment to the constitution of Lhe United States,.rhich
provides that Congress shall make no law rsepecting an
establishment or free exercise of religion. No better dis-
cussion of the subject can be made than is contained in
the following quotations from the opinion of Chief .us-
tice Waite in the decisioh of the Reynolds case:
"It is impossible to believe that the constitutional
gauranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit
legislation in respect to the most important feature of
social life. Marriage,while from its very nature a sacred
obligation, is,nevertheless,in most civilized nations,a
civil contract,and usually regulated by law. Upon it so-
ciety may be said to be built,and out of its fruits
spring social relations and social obligations and dutieq,
with which government is necessarily required to deal.xxx
In our opinion the statute immediately under consid-
eration is within the legislative power of Congress. It
is constituttonal and valid as prescribing a rule of ac-
tion for all those residing in the Territories,and in
places over which the United States have exclusive con-
trol. This being so,the only question which remains is,
whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion
are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they
arethen those who do not make polygamy a part of their
religious belief may be found guilty and p-unishd,while
those who do must be acquited and go free. This would be
introducing a now element into criminal law. Laws are
made for the government of nations,and while they cannot
interfere witli mere religious belief and opinions,thiey
may with practices, x x x
"A criminal intent is generally an element of crime,
but every man is presumed to intend the necessary and
legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does. Here
the accused knew he had been once married,and that his
first wife was living. He also knew that his second mar-
riage was forbidden by law. Whentherefore,he married a
second time,he is presumed to have intended to break the
law. And the breaking of the law is the crime. Every act
necessary to constitute the crime was knowingly doneand
the crime wasthereforekno ingl-- conmitted."
3efore the Reynolds' trialan important act had been
passed by Congress which greatly restricted the few pow-
ers of local self-government enjoyed by the pcople of
Utah. Its full effect can only be aprrediated by remem-
bering the limited degree of sovereignty possessed by the
people under a Territorial form of government. The Gov-
ernor,the Secretary of the Territory,all the judgesthe
United States Attorney and Marshal,and many other offi-
cers are appointed by the President of the United States,
and are in no way responsible to the people. This "Act in
relation to the courts and judicial officers in the Ter-
ritory of Utah",was apporved June 23rd, 1874. It abolish-
ed the offices of Territorial Marshal and Attorney Gen-
eral,and conferred the powers and duties of these offi-
cers upon the United States Marshal and United States
Attorney;regulated the jurisdiction of DistrictProbate
and Justice's Courts and made such provision in regard to
the drawing of -rand and petit juries as,with an amend-
ment made by Congress 1887,left tihe majority of the pop-
ulation of the Territory without representation on juries;
took from the people the power to elect officers to which
they were entitled to represent them in the highest
courts of the Territory.
This act was followed in the year 1882 by the so
called "Edmunds Law" entitled "An act to amend section
fifty three hundred and fifty two of the Revised Statutes
of the United States,in reference to bigamy,and for other
purposes". This act,very comprehensive in its scope,de-
fined and prescribed penalties for the crimes of polygamy
and unlawful cohabitation;required additional qualifica-
tions for jurors serving in such cases;legitimated the
offsrring of rolygamous marriages;disqualified polyga-
mists to votehold office,or serve on juries,4nd provided
for a conmission of five persons to be appointed by the
President of the UMited Stateswho should have povver to
appoint all the registration and election officers in the
Territory. Section nine of the ".Edmunds Act" reads as
follo -s:
"Section 9. That all tha registration and election
officeu of every description in the Territory of Utah
are hereby declared vacantand each and every duty re-
lating to the registration of voters,the conduct of elec-
tions,the receiving or rejection of votes,and the can-
vassing and return of the same,and the issuing of certif-
icates or other evidence of election in said Territory,
shall,-until other provision be made by the Legislative
Assembly of said Territory as is hereinafter by this sec-
tion provided,be performed under the existing laws of the
United States and of said Territory by proper persons,
who shall be appointed to execut-e such offices and per-
form such duties by a board of five persons,to be appoint-
ed by the President,by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate. x x x The canvass and return of all the
votes cast at elections in said Territory for members of
the Legislative Assembly there!of shall also be returned
to said boardwhich shall canvass all such returns and
issue certificates of election to ,those persons whobeing
eligible for such election,shall appoar to have been law-
fully elect cd,which certificates shall be the only evi-
dence of the right of such persons to sit in such assem-
bly: PROVIDED, That said board of five persons shall not
exclude any person otherwise eligible to vote from the
polls on account of an.r opinion such person may entertain
on the subject of bigamy or polygamynor shall they re-
fuse to count any such vote on account of the opinion of
the person casting it on the subject of bigamy or polyg-
amy".
It seems very evident from this section that the
commission thereby created had but one duty to perform
prior to election,and that -,ras to appoint the registra-
tion and election officers to fill the vacancies created
by the act. After performing this duty,the commission was
functus officio until called upon to canvass and return
the votes for members of the Le!rislature. Instead of per-
forming this plain and simple duty,the commission pro-
ceeded to constitute itself a coordinate department of
the Territorial government,by making rules and r gula-
tions for the registration of voters and the conducting
of elections,hearing appealsand acting as if vested with
legislative and judicial powers. By prescribing an oath
to be taken b-, persons applying for registration an ex
post facto operation was given to the law. Not only then
polygamists but all persons who had ever occupied that
status,although they might have discontinued the practice
and abandoned tha polygamous relation,were excluded from
voting and holding office. Applicants for registration
were accorded the privilege of appealing from the decis-
ion of the registration officer to the cormissionfrom
which the oath and rules debarring them from exercising
the elective franchise,had eminated.
It seems strange that the cormission could so mis-
take its powers and duties. They were clearly defined in
the law as extending only to the appointment of registra-
tion and election officers,the canvass and return of
votes cast for members of the Legislative Assemblyand
the issuance of certificates of election to such persons
as their might find entitled to the same. If the language
of the law was not sufficiently clear as to the intention
of Congress,and especially of the distinguished author of
the actthe debates in the Senate at the time of the
passage of the bill showed that the idea of the commiss-
ioners having an% such powers as tiley a~ssmed to exer-
cise was never contemplated by Congress. A5 reported in
the Congressional Record,1882,Volume 13,Part 2,page 1156,
Senator Edmunds said:
"As to the qualification of electors,the board of
five persons are not by this bill vested with any power
at all;they are left exactly where they are left by tie
other laws of the United States and the laws of the Ter-
ii
ritory of Utah.
And the laws of the Territory of Utah and of the
United States made ample provision for the registration
of voters and the regulation and conducting of elections
in the Territory.
Under this section of one of the most important acts
in the history of the Territory,a number of test cases
arose,upon statements of fact which are very similar.
The cases were carried to the Supreme Court of the United
States,submitted upon t1-e same briefs and decided by the
court in one opinion.
Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15-47.
The plaintiff Murphy was deprived of the privilege
of voting,under the legislation of the commissionhe hav-
ing once been a polygamist but not occupying that status
10.
at the time he applied to register. He sued the cormniss-
ioners,countv registration officersand the deputy reg-
istrar in the precinct in which he resided and by the
laws of the Territory was entitled to vote. Judgment was
rendered for the defendants in the District Court and was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory. Mr. Jus-
tice Matthews,in delivering tha opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States,said:
"An examination of the ninth section of the act of
March 22nd, 1882,providing for the appointment and pre-
scribing the duties ahd powers of that boardshows that
they have no functions whatever in respect to the regis-
tration of voters,except the appointment of officers in
place of those previously authorizedwhoze offices are by
that section of the law declared to be vacant;and the per-
song appointed to succeed them are not subject to the di-
rection and control of the board,but are required,until
other provision be made by the Legislative Assembly of
the Territoryto perform all duties relating to the reg-
istration of voters 'under the existing laws of the Uni-
ted States and of said Territory'. The board are not
authorized to prescribe rules for governing them in the
performance of these duties,much less to prescribe any
1 .
qualifications for voters as a condition of registration.
The proviso in the section does indeed declare 'that said
board of five persons shall not exclude any person,other-
wise eligible to vote,from the polls on account of any
opinion such person may entertain on the subject of big-
amy or polygamy',but in the absence of any general and
express power over the subject of declaring the qualifi-
cations of votersit is not a just inference from the
words of this proviso that it was intended to admit by
implication the existence of any authority in the board
to exclude from registration or the right to vote, any
person whateveror in any manner to define and declare
what the qualifications of a voter shall be# x x x
"It follows that thu rules promulgated by the board,
prescribing the form of oath to be exacted 'of persons
offering to register as voters and which constitute the
directions under which it is alleged the registration of-
ficers actedwere without force and no effect can be
given them."
It was contended by the appellants that Section
Eight of the Edmunds Act violated that provision of the
Constitution of the United States which prohibits Cop- -
gress from passing any bill of attainder or ex post facto
120
law.
That Congress has no more power to pass a bill of
attainder or ex post facto law for the Territory of Utah
than for the State of New York,there can be no question.
Section eighteen hundred and ninety one of the Revised
Statutes of the United States provides that "fThe Consti-
tution and all laws of the United States which are not
locally inapplicable,shall have the same force and effect
within all the organized Territories,and. in every Terri-
tory hereafter organizedas elsewhere *ithin the Unite.
States .
Sre also Dred v. Sandford 19 Howard, 449-50.
It i.- settled bir the Supreme Court of the United
States,that the deprivation of the right to vote or hold
office may be punishmentthe circumstances attrnding and
causes of the deprivation determining that fact. A statutb
inflicting such punishment without legal trial and con-
victionis a bill of pains and penalties or a bill of
attainder,prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States. An ex post facto law is one which imposes a pun-
ishment for an act which was not punishable at the time
it was cormitted,or imposes an additional punishment to
that then prescribeui,or changes the rules of evidence by
139
which less or different testimony is sufficient to con-
vict than was then required.
Cu nings v. Missouri, 4 Wale 277.
Ex parte Garland 4 Wal. 233.
Huber v. Riley 3 P.T.Smith 112.
The foregoing priicirles senmed to decide! th3 Toint
aj contended for by the appellant Murphy that section
Eight of the Edmtuds law was pinatory,and,as construed by
the commission constituted a bill of attainder. Whatever
the power of Congress might be to prescribe the qualifi-
cation of votersit could not,witlout trial and convic-
tionunder cover of such legislation,inflict punishment
upon a citizen for an offence previously committed. So
soon as the fact appeared that the object of the law was
punatorythe constitutional inhabition applied.
"In the construction of a statuteevery part of it
must be viewed in connection with the whole,so as to make
all its parts harmonious,if practicable,and give a sen-
sible and intelligent effect to each".
Dwarris on Statutes, 144.
Lord Mansfield says: "That all laws which relate to
the same subject,notwithstanding some of them may be ex-
pired or not noticed,must b_ taken to be one act and con-
14.
strued consistently."
Chancellor Kent says: "It is to be inferred that a
code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by
one spirit and policy,and was intended to be consistent
and harmonious in its several parts."
1 Kent's Comrnentaries, 463.
The question was,did the purity of the eldetive
franchise or the punishment of bigarnists and polygamists
inspire the enactment of Section Eight of the Edmunds Law?
If intended for the purpose first named.,would it not have
been made an amendment to that section of the organic act
which relates exclusively to the qualifications of voters
in Utah,instead of being made a part of an act which cre-
ated the crime of polygamy and prescribed a penalty
therefor? If the purpose of Section Eight was to preserve
the purity of the elective franchiseby preventing it -
from being exercised by persons practicing polygamy,the
proviso of Section Nines-would have no place in the law.
The Supreme Court of the United. States upheld the
statute and in its d-ecisionsaid:
"In our opinion, every man is a bigamist or polyga-
mist in the sense of this jcction of the actho,having
pi-evi-usly marriedhas one wife still living,and having
anoLher at the time when he presents Liimself to claim
registration as a vote-,still maintaIns that relation to
a plurality of wives,although,from the date of the pass-
age of the act of March 22nd, 1882,u-ntil the day he
offers to register and votehe may not in fact have co-
habited with more than one woman. Without regard to the
question whether at the time he entered into such a.rela-
tion,it was a prohibited and punishable offenceor wheth-
er by reason of lapse of time sInce its commission a pros-
ecution for it may not be barred,if he still maintains
the relationhe is a bigamist or polygamistbecause that
is the status which the fixed habit and practice of his
living has established* He has a plurality of wives --
more than ohe woman whom he recognizes as a wife,of whose
children he is the acknowledged fatherand whom,with
their children,he maintains as a family of which he is
the head. And this status as to several wives may well
continue to exist as a practical relation,although for a
period he may not in fact cohabit with more than one;for
that is quite consistent with the constant recognition
of the same relation to many,accompanied with the poss-
ible Intention to renew cohabitation with one oL- more of
the others when it may be convenient."
15.
16.
Section Three of the Edyntnds Act provides "That if
any male person in a Territory or other place over which
the United States have exclusive jurisdlction,hereafter
cohabits with more than one woman,he shall be guilty of
a misdemeanorand on conviction thereof shall be punished
by a fine of not more than Three Hundred Dollars,or by
imprlsonment for not more than Six months,or by both said
punishments,in the discretion of the court.
In 1885, Angus M. Cannon was indicted and convicted
in the Third District Court of Utah Territory for unlaw-
question
ful cohabitation under this section. The importantA in the
case was the meaning of the word 'cohabit" as used in
that section. On the trialthe defendant offered to prove
that while lie still continued to reside under the same
roof with the women named in the indictment as his wives,
eating at their respective tables alternatelyand ac-
knowledging said women as wives,upon the passage of the
Edmunds Act he had changed his mode of living by non-ac-
cess to the beds ofsaid wonien,and had declared his in-
tention not to violate the law. This evidence was exclud-
edand the aefendant excepted*
The Court charged the jury:"If you believe from the
evidencebeyond a reasonable doubtthat the defendant
17.
lived in the same house wlth Amanda Cannon and Clara CO
Cannonthe women named in the indictmentand ate at their
respeutive tables one third of the time or thereabouts,
that h- held them out to the world by his language or
conduct or by both as his wives,you should find him
guilty." This instruction was excepted to by the defend-
antv
The court refused to charge the jury as follows:
"Sexual intercourse is a necessary element of the crime
of cohabitation,and if the jury find the defendant has
rt~ I'd sexual intercourse with both Clara C. and Amanda
Ca~r. nce the passage of the Edxnunds Act and within
the dates named in the indictment,then they should acquit
the defendant.' Defendant excepted to the refusal of the
court to give this instr-action.
Mr. Cannon was convicted,and the case was ca.ried to
the Supreme Court of the United Stateswhere the decis-
ion of the trial court was sustained In a short opinion,
in which the court decided that nexual intercourse was
not a necessar'y ingredlant of the crime prohibited by
this section. It seemed tQ base its decision upon the
theory that sufficient acts of the defendant had been
shown to evidence a "holding out"%-Oo Oie world" of these
18
women as wives,whici constituted the offence.
Cannon v# United States, 116 UeS. 55.
Justices Miller and Field dissented in the following
concise statement of the law: "I think that the act of
Congress,when prohibiting conlabitation with more than or
womanmeant iulawful,habitual sexual intercourse.
"It is ir my opinion a stralned construction ofra
highly penal statiite to hold that a man can be guilty,
under that statute,without the accompaniment of sexual
connect ion,
"I know of no instance in which the word "cohabita-
tionw has been used to describe a criminal offence where
it did not imply sexual intercourse."
This view in regard to the interpretation of this
statute would certainly be favored from a reading of the
lawparticularly those clauses in regard to the legiti-
mating of children and the power of the President to
grant amnesty in cases of marriages contracted before the
passage of Lhe law. It would seem that it was not the in-
tention of Congress to compel the desertion and abandon-
ment of these women and their childrenbut rather to im
pose a duty upon the man to provide for them,but to re-
frain from contracting future marriagesand from cohabit-
190
ing with plural wives. Had a less strict construction
been placed on this act,the results accomplished might
not have been the same# But I cannot help thinking that
the fundamental principle of law was correctly stated by
the minority of the Court,*
A discus3ion of the necessity for such a law or the
benefits 'o be derived from its passagewould be eniArely r
out of place in a treatise of this characterbut whether
or not it woiild have failed in the ultimate object aimed
at by Congress,certainly should not,in justice or lawbe
consIdered by the court in its construction. It would
seem that the construction given td this statute -- one
of a highly penal character and demanding the strictest
construction -- was rather in the nature of an amendment
to/the lawthan an attempt to bring it within the inten-
tion of Congress as evidenced by the actand it has the
appearance of an effort to adapt the law to the exigen-
cies of the occaslon.
WebsLer and other- lexicographers substantially agree
in two definitions of the word "cohabit". (1). "To dwell
with. To inhabit or reside in company or in the same
place or country. (2). To dwell or live together as hus-
band and wife., If the court had adopted tho first mean-
20#
ing as evincing the intention of Congress,it would have
led to the most absurd consequences. That definition must
be rejected as having no application to the word as used
in this statute. It implies no intimacy -- no relation
r~iquiring legal regulation -- certainly no restriction on
account of the difference in sex. The other definition
implies intimacy -- sexual intimacy-- and a degree of it
illustrated by the dwelling together of husband and wife.
This statute must have been to prevent the liting togeth-
er of an adult male person with more tham one woman in
the same intimacy as is usual between husband and vife.
All cohabitation which the law deals with is sexual
cohabitation. The law regulates and draws inferences from
it,because it imports a living together in the habitual
practice of sexual intercotrse. No intimacy of the sexes
is offensive to the public nor could be criminal under
the statute,unless it includes in fact or b,, necessary
prest.iption sexual intercourse.
The word "cohabit" has nevr be-n used in anyr crimi-nal
law, to mean anything less than actual sexual intercours,
and if the idea of habit and frequency implied in th wqrd
(as distinguished from isolated acts),was not requirod,
the wo'd "cohabitation" 'in such statutes could be chang-
21.
ed'to'"sexual intercourse" and the term "lewd or lasciv-
ious c,)_'abitation",can be paraphrased to read ulascivious
and habitual or frequent sexual intercourse" ,without any
change of signification. When in a civil case a question
arises as to the consumation of a marriage,the term "co-
habitation, has been deemed as an equivalent of sexual
relations,and could have no other meaning. So if the
question is whetler a malitall offence has been condoned,,
Ghe cohabitation after knowledge of the offence means
sexual intercourse only.
Drum v. Drum 4 Paige 425.
It is not necessary that tho wife shall withdraw
from the house. She may be unable to do so,and it is
enough that she cease cohabiting with the husband by
withdrawing from his bed*
The popular use of the wordespecially when applied
to the relation of the sexes,sonforms to this meaning,and
whether we look to judicial procaedings,lexicographers or
connor. spech,the same significance is found. Had Con-
Press intended to use the word in a new signification,
would not a definition have been given to carry out the
intent?
It seems misleading to asume that this statute re-
22.
fers onl:r to cohabitation under the marriage relation,and
that the word "cohabit" relates only to those associating
under the form of a marriage contract,-- a necessary in-
ference from the decision of the cout* Such an assunp-
tion ;'i2ats the void marriage rel3tion as a constituent
of !,*e offence and a part of its definition, instead of
treating it only as a mattor of evidence tending to raise
resu rptions of fact going to establish the offence.
Cohabitation does not only mean the living together
of husband and wife,but the living together of a man and
woman as husband and wife. It refers to the manner of
living and not the, contractand therefore includes hus-
band and wife and all men and women who assume their
habits of living. Unless this is the meaning of the term,
statutes against lewd and lascivious cohabitation could
not be enforced,unless the prosecutor could show a void
1a1ital contract o" relation,and such statutes would fail
to reach the cases intended to b) included* In such cases
it is the habit and freq,7ency of the vi3it and sexual
relations which makes the cohabitation.
By the decisions of the courts,the term "any male
person" in this section was limited to the term "any male
person wvho in a polygamous relation, etc." Such a con-
23.
struction would not only incorporate new words and incorp-
orate a new meaning,but would give an ex post facto ap-
plication to the law,by making a past act an essential
part of an offence to which. a new punishment was annexed,
and would revive past offences,though prosecutions lvore
barred b- the ,;tatute of limitatioi',
The maxtmrim punishment prescribed for the offence
of unlawful cohabitation was six months imprisonment in
the Peni!:entiary and $300. fine. Thinking this penalty
too slightthe prosecuting officers und~rtook to increase
it in a rather singular way. Lor~nzo Snow was indicted
separately in the First District Court of the Territory
of Utah on 'liree indictments for unlawful cohabitation,
covering together a continuous pe.-iod of time,eech cover-
ing a different partbut tho !hree parts being continuous;
the indictments being found at the samo tfmTe,br the same
-rand\ jiu ",on th; same oath and on or - examination of the
same ":itnessescoverinr thewhole continuous time. The
cases were tried in the invel'se order f u .1,at in which
t -e several crimes charged w,oe cuf:wJe. On the trial
of each of the tvo latter che.-fs,the defendant entered
a special plea of Autrifois Convict,.vhich was overruled.
One judgment was entered in,the three cases. It first
24 .
imposed a term of imprisonment and fine;it then imposed
two other successive terms of imprisonment and fines,each
to begin at the expiration of the last preceding sentence.
The judgment set foi-6h the time embraced by each indict-
mentand specified each of the three punishments as being
imposed in respect of a specified one of the indictments.
The defendantLorenzo Snow,v s given a maximum pun-
ishment in each of, the three counts..After serving his
term of imprisonment and paying the fine imposed on the
first count,he applied to the District Court for a writ
of habeas corpusclaiming that he had been convicted
three times for the same offense;that three punishments
had been imposed therefor;that he had satisfied the full
penalty of the law and was being punished the second time
for one and the same offense. The writ was refused and
an appeal taken to the Supreme Court of the United States,
which holj 'h--t there was but one entire offense for the
continuous timeand ordered the discharge of the prisoner.
Mr. Justice Blatchford.,after explaining the theory
of unlawful cohabitation as laid down in the Cannon case,
said:
"There was but a single offense cor nitued prior to
the time the indictments were found. This appears on the
25.
face of the judgment. It refers to the indictments as
found 'for the crime of inlawful cohabitation conmitted'
'during the time' stated,divided into three periods ac-
cording to each indictment. For so much of the offense as
covered each of these periods the defendant is,according
to the judgmentto be imprisoned for six months and to
pay a fine of $300. The division of the two years and
eleVen months is wholly arbitrary. On the same principle,
there might have been an indictment covering each of the
thirty five monthswith imprisonment for seventeen years
and a half and fines amounting to $10,500. or even an in-
dictment covering every week,with imprisonment for seven-
ty four years and fines amounting to $44,400. and so on
ad infinitem for smaller periods of time. It is to pre-
vent such an application of penal laws,that the rule has
obtained that a continuing offense of the character of
the one in this case can be committed but once,for the
purpose of indictment or prosecution,rrior to the time
the prosecution is instituted."
In Re Snow, 120 U.S. 27zt.
A thorough and able discussion of this subject by
Lord Mansfield is given in the cas3 of Crepps V. Durden,
Cowper 640,quoted from at length in the opinion of the
26.
court,
The third section of an act of Congress of March 3rd,
1887,entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to
amend section fifty three hundred and fifty two of the
Revised Statutes of the United States,in reference to
bigamy and for other purposes," provides:
"That whoever commits adultery shall be punished b,7
imprisonment in the Penitentiarynot exceeding three
years;and when the act is committed between a married wo-
man and a man who is unmarried.,both parties to such act
shall be deemed guilty of adultery;and when such act is
committed between a married manand a woman who is unmar-
ried,the man shall be deemed guilty of adultery."
Acting upon the theory that sexual intercourse was
not an essential element of unlawful cohabitationand
perhaps stimulated by a desire for gloryeasily obtained
by prosecuting an unpopular sectthe representatives of
the government devised a new scheme for adding to the
burdens already carried by those offending against this
legislation. Although forbidden to segregate the offense
of unlawful cohabitation,they proceeded to indict for the
latter offense,and then indicted for adultery occuring
between the same parties during the period covered by the
27.
cohabitation. This was somewhat consistent with the decis-
ion of the court in the Cannon casefrom which it seemed
that 'holding out' the wives constituted the offense of
cohabitation,instead of sexual intercourse.
On the 27th, day of September,1888,two indictments
were foundby the same grand jury,against Hans Nielson in
the First District Court of Utah Territoryone for un-
lawful cohabitation under section three of the Edmunds
Act,and the other for adultery under the section last
quoted* The first indictment charged that on the 15th,
day of October,1888,and continuously from that time to
the 13th, of May,1388,the said Nielson conmitted the of-
fense of unlawful cohabitation with two women named I
therein. The second indictment charged the said Nielson
with having conmmitted the crime of adultery with one of
the same women named in the other indictment,on the 14th,
of May,1888.
The defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge
of unlawful cohabitation,and when arraigned on the charge
of adultery,entered a plea of former conviction. This
plea was over-ruled. He pleaded not guiltyand was con-
victed of the crime of adultery. Sentence was pronounced
in each case,and after Nielson had served his term in th2
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Penitentiary and satisfied the judgment against him for
unlawful cohabitationhe applied for a writ of habeas
corpusclaiming that he had been twice convicted for the
same offense;that he had paid the full penalty of the 1-w
and was now being punished twice for one and the same of-
fense. The writ was denied,and an appeal taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States,where it was h31ld that
the offense of unlawful cohabitation was a continuing one
up to the time that the indictment was found.,and subject
only to one prosecution.
Mr. Justice Bradley,delivering the opinion of the
Court, said:
"True,in the case of Snow,we held that it was not
necessary to prove sexual intercourse in order to make
out a case of unlawful cohabitation;that living together
as man and wife was sufficient;but this was only because
proof of sexual intercourse would have been merely cuvnu-
lative evidence of the fact. Living togother as man and
wife is what we decided was meant by unlawful cohabitant-i
tion under the statute. Of course that includes sexual
intercourse. And this was the integral part of the adul-
tery charged in the second indictment,and was covered by
and was included in the first indictment and conviction."
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In the case of Morey v. Conmnonwoalth, 108 Mass.,Mr.
Justice Grey lays down the following proposition,rhich
accords with the decision in this; case: "A conviction of
Ueing a corion seller of' intoxicating liquors ha3 been
held to bar a prosecution for a single sale of such li-
quors .,ithin the same time,upon the ground that tie lass-
er offense,which is full- proved by evidence of the mere
fact of unlawfully making a salelis merged in the greater
offense;but an acquital of the offense of being a common
seller does not have the like effect,"
In that case the court held that a conviction for
le'vdlv and lasciviously associating and cohabiting with
a certain f er.iaio to whorn he was not married,would not bar
prosecution on an indictmant for several acts of adultery
committed during the aame period of time eimibraced in the
former,on th3 ground that different evidence was required
to support a conviction in each case."The test is, not
whether the defendant has already bee- tried for the same
actbut whether he has been put in jeopardy for tle same
offenses"
& pare Hans Nielson, 131 U.S,, 176-.
Ir. this case it was held that where a court is with-
out authority to pass a particular sentence,siich sentence
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is vuJid and the defendant imprisoned under it may be dis-
charged on habeas corpus. A judgment in a criminal case
denying to a prisoner a constitutional rifht,or inflict-
ing an unconstitutional penalty,ie void and m-y be dis-
charged on habeas corpus.
When the Territory of Utah was organized,the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was a de facto co",p-
oration,existing under an ordinance of the provisional
government of the State of Deseret. In 1885,the Legisla-
tive Assembly of the Territory of Utah validated the or-
dinance incorporating tho Church.
By the acL of Congress of July lst,'1b62,before re-
ferred to,Congres3 disapproved so much of the act incorp-
orating said Church as tended to .establish,maintain,
protect or countenance the practice of polygamy",and pro-
hibted religious and charitable corporations and associa-
tions fj'om acquiring or holding mlore than V50,O00. 'worth
of real estate.
The act of Congress of March 3rd,1887,entitled "An
act to amend an act entitled 'An act to amend section 52,,
53 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,in refer-
ence to bigamy and for other purposes,aproved March 2'2n,
1882", provided:
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"That the acts of the L.gislative Assembly of th;
Territory of Utah incorporatingcontilnuilng or providing
for the corporation known as the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints,and thr3 ordinance of the so called
General Assembly of the Statre of Deseret incorporating
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,so far as
the same may now have legal force and validity are hereby
disapproved and annulle4,and the said corporation, in so
far as it may no,, have or pretend to have any legal ex-
istence is hereby dissolved."
The same act made it the duty of the Attorney Gener-
al of the United States to conmmence proceedings in the
Supreme Court of Utah "to wind up the affairs of said
corporation conformably to Law",and also, 'o institute
proceedings to forfeit and escheat to the United States
property held in violation of the act of Congress of July
lst,1862,above referred to.
In June 1887,a suit was instituted on behalf of the
United States against the late corporation of the Clhurch
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and its trustees,pray-
ing for the a-flfintment of a receiver to take charge of
the assets,property and effects of the corporation,and to
hold the same subject to such disposition as the court
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might make of them;for a decree declaring the charter of
tho corporation of th Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints dissolved and gnnullqeand fo' all necessary
orders and dacrees to wind up the affair,- of the corpora-
tion conformably to law and equity.
The defendants ir this suit clairned that the act of
Congress was unconstitutionalin so far as it attempted
to annull the charter or dissolve the 2hurch corporation,
because the said charter was an executed contract which
could not be impaired.,and the act was in the nature of a
legislative decree of dissolution.
Members of the Church intervened and claimed that if
the corporationi had been legally dissolved,the Church,as
an unincorporated body,was entitled to the property of
the corporation.
The Supreme Court of thr Territory of Utah held that
the act of Congress was constitutional and decreed that
the corporation was dissolved. It also adjudged the per-
sonal property of the corporation,which wa3 of the value
of nearly half a million Dollars,forfeited and escheated
to the United States,because "the doctrine of polygamy o--
plurality of wives was one of the doctrine3,teachings and
practices of the corporation.
' ,
The real estate had all been seized by the recciver,.
but the temple and tabernacle used by said sect for the
worship of God were set apart to tho Church for that pur-
pose,the remainder of the realty being e~cheated to the
United States including a piece of land acquired in 1847
when Salt Lake City was first laid out.
Thils case was taken to the Supreme Court of the
Unite- States,vrhere the decision of the lowier court was
affiri-ed so far as it upheld the act of Congress and de-
creed the dissolution of the Church corporation,but was
modified in reference to the disposition of the personal
property,Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Field and La-
mar dissenting.
Tha late corporation of the Church of
Jesu- CI-Iit of Lattgr-dFy Saints et
'alVUnliad, States
130 U.S. 27-50.
140 U.S. 665.
On the question as to what disposition should be
made of the propertythe court says: "When a business
corporation instituted fo-' the purpose of -ain or private
interestis dissolved,the modern doctrine is that its
property,after pannent of its debts,equitably belongs to
its stockholders. But this doctrine has never been ex"
tended to public or charitable corporations. As to these
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the ancient and setablished rule prevailsnamely:that
,:hen a corporation is dissolved,its personal prop .rty,
like that of a man dying without hoirs,ceases to be the
subject of private ownership,and becomes subject to th3
disposal of the sovereign authority,whilst its real estate
reverts or escheats to the grantor or donorunless some
ot:ler course of devolution has bean directed b" positive
law,though still subjectas we shall hereafter see,to the
charitable use."
The pleadings and findings of fact showi that all of
said Property was donated for religious and charitable
uses. Following a rabid denunciation of the Mormon ChurcN,
its aims and objects,particularly as to the practice of
polyrgamy,which the eminent jurist characterizes as its
principal object,he proceeds to show that the property
so held should not be used for the furtherance of an un-
lawful practice or design. After citing casEoG from the
Pandects of Justinian dowvn to the present time,and laying
down the well established Cy pres doctrine as applicable
to the case at barthe courtthrourh Mr. Justice Bradley,
says:
"These authorities are citel (and -any more might be
adduced) for the purpose of' showiing that where property
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has been devoted to a public or charitable use,.vhich can-
not be carried out on account of some illegality inore
failure of,the object,it does not,according to the genor-
al laws of charities,revert to the donor or hi.3 heirs,or
other representatives,but is applied under the direction
of the courts ,ojr of the supreme power in tiLe State,to
other charitable objects,lawful in their character,but
corresponiding as nearly as may be to the origihal inten-
tion of the donor."
The mo-st irriortant question involved in the case was
that regarding the constitutionality of the act of Con-
gress anulling the charter of the Church. It was upon
this point that the distinguished Chief Justice and two
of the associate justices dissented. The court says:
"The power of Congress over the Territories of the
United States is general and plenary,arising from and in-
cidental to the right to acquire the territory itselfand
from the power ,iven by the constitution to make all need-
fLtl rules and regulations respecting the territory or
other property belonging to th e United States. It would
be absurd to hold that the United States has power to ac-
quire territory and no po'.er to govern it wvhen acquired.
The power to acquire territory,other !han the territory
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Northwest of the Ohio Riv-r,(which belonged to the United
States at tine adoption of th Constitution),is dLrived
fro.,. the treaty making power and the po':Tr to declare ind
carry on war. The incidents of these power,3 are those of
national sovereigIJty,and belong to all governmonts. The
power to make acquisitions of territory by Congress,b'
treaty and by cession,is an incident,of national sov!r-
eig',ity., x x x The propositions are so elementary,and so
follow
necessarilyAfrom t!,e condition of things arising upon the
acquisition of new territory,that they need no argument
to supcort them. They aj-e self-evident."
Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511,542.
Benner v. Porter,9 Ho-v. 235,242.
Nat. Bank v. Yankton,lO1 U.S. 129.
Murphyr v. Ramsey,114 U.S. 15,44.
Holding that there was no, question that tue acts of
July lst,1862,and March 3rd,1887,were both valid exercise
of Congressional power,Chief Juistice Fuller,in the dis-
senting opinio.- of the minority of the court,says:
"Congress possesses such authority over the Territo-
-?-is s th Constitution expressly or by clear inprlica-
tion delegates. Doubtless territory may be acquired by
the direct action of Congress,as in the annexation of
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Texas;by treaty,as in the case of Louisiana;or,as in ti'e
case of Califrrnia,bv- conquest e.nd afterljrarri b)r treaty;
but th, po;vler of Congress to legislate over the Territo-
ries is grantect in so many words b r t _e Constittion.
Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2.
"And it is further thereIn provided that 'Congress
shall have power to make all laws which shall be nec-:; s-
ary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers,and all other powers vested by this constitution
in the government of th United Statesor ih any depart-
ment or officer thereof'.'
"In my opinion Congress is restrainednot merely by
the limitations expressAd in the Constitutionbut also
by the absence of any grant of powerexpress or implied,
in that instrumentv And no such power as that involved in
the act of Congress under consideration is conferred by
the Constitutionnor is any clause pointed out as its
legitimate source. I retard it of vital consequence that
absolute power should never be conceded as belonging,un-
der our system of governmentto any one of ito depart-
ments. The legislative po,,,er of Congress is delegated and
not inherent,and is therefore linitedo I agree that the
pourer to make needful rules and regulations for the Ter-
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ritories necessarily comprehends th? power to suppress
c,'ime;and it is immaterial,even thoug h that crime assumes
the form of a relig[ious belief or creod. Congress has th,
powe' to extripate polygamy in any of the Territories,by
the eactment of a criminal code directed to that end;
bu'. it is not authorized under the cover of that power to
seize and confiscate the property of personsindividuals
or corporations,wvithout office found,because they may
have boon guilty of criminal.practices.9
"The doutrine of Cy pres is one of construction and
not of admiistrationf- By it a fund devoted to a particu-
lar charity is applied to a cognate purpose,and if the
purpose for which this property was accumulated was such
as has been depicted,it cannot be brought within the rule
of application to a purpose as nearly as possible resem-
bling that denounced. Nor is there here any counterpart
in congressional power to the exercise of the royal pre-
rogative in the disposition of a charity. If this proper-
ty was accumulated for j:, poses declared illegal,that
does not justify its arbitrary disposition by 'Judicial
legislation. In my judgmentits diversion under this act
of Congress is in controvention of specific limitations
in the Constitution;unauthorized,expressly or by implica-
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tion,by any of its provisions;and in diL gaird of the
fundamental principle that the legislative power of the
United Stites as exercised by the agents of the pe ople of
this rrpublicis deler7ated and not inherent."
The privelege of the -rritof habeas corpus,th right
o trial by jury,tt.he prohibition against the passage of
bills of attainder or ex post facto laws,o- laws respect-
ing the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,or' abridging the freedom of speech,or
the pressor depriving any person of life,liberty or prop-
erty,without due process of law,or denying to any person
the equal protection of the law,are secvred and recogniz-
ed by the express provisions of the Constitution. And it
is equally well established by the decision of the Sn-
prei.ie Court of the United States that Congress can pass
no law impairing t1e obligation of contractsor legislate
back to the government property that has been given away
by actj of Congress,or divest title of property from one
citizen and give it to another,because such acts are re-
pugnant to the spi-'it of our iistitutions.
The Territory of Utah,bT virtue of the Organic Act
of 1850,becanie a political organization -- a body politic.
In one sense it might be likened to a municipalityand as
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such had power to act through a Legislative Assembly and
a Governor. Their,for the time being,'wre the represent?-
tives of the political organization,and as such they haL
rower to act for the interests of all the inhabitants of
the Territory. They coulK,, pass laws for the opening and
improvemnt of highways,for the organization of militia,
for the support and gove'nment of common schoolsfor the
building of jails and periteetiariesand it could scarc -
iV be claimed that,if the L -islative Assembly and gov-
ernment should,by ordinance or law,make a contract wIith a
an individual foa the performance of any public service,
the Oongres_- of the United States could,bj q simple de"
claration disapproving such an act,after the contracting
party had performed services under it,annull and set a-
side such a contract* And the Supreme C :u: t has said that
the relation of the Territorial government is much the
same as that which counties bear to the respectiv? States,
and that Congress may legislate fo:- them as a State does
for its municiple or anizations. And yet it could not be
claimed that ,hen a municiple organization had been cre-
ated by a State Legislaturevesting it .,ith certain pow-
ers under which that municiple organization had made con-
tracts with individuals ur corporationstherefore,because
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the State Government might entirely abolish 3uch a munic-
iple organizationit could also impair the obligations of
contract made b r such municiple organization -r!hile it was
in being.
In th sinking fund cases, 99 u.s. 718,the Supreme
Court says: "The United State: cannot,any more than a
Stateinterfere with private rigm-t s, ,xcept for legitimate
gove'>miental purroses. They are not included within the
constitutional prohibition which prevents States from
pawiing laws impairing ;ho obligation of contractsbut,
equally with the States,they are prohibited from detpriv-
in, persons or corporations of propertv w!1ithout due pro-
cess of law. Tha UniLed States are as much bound by their
contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their ob-
lihatiors,it is as much repudiationL,with all the wrong
and reproach that the term implies,as it1 would b3 if the
repudiator had been a Stateor a imunicipality,or a citi-
zun."
Similar quotations from numerous cases might be made
would space permit.
Murphy v. Raimey, 114 U.S. 44.
Dartmouth College Cases,4 Wheat .637.
Miller v. State, 15 Wal. 488.
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Railroad v. Church, 98 U.S. 108.
Petinoylvania College Cases,3 Wal.212.
St.P"it.Cath.Cong. v. The German Oath. Cong.
104 Ill. 440.
Holyroke v. Lyman, 15 Wal. 500.
In these and mant other cases,to which rferenco
might b mad3,the courts held that,in order to give the
Legislature power to repeal,alter or amend a charter of
incorporation,tL ere must be either an express reservation
in the charter itselfor some provision of 11h,) general
law or of the Constitution,on the subject of corporations,
which reserved this power to the L-'J islature and,so far
as I have been able to discover,there is no case w,:hich
maintains a contrary doctr-ine. The general power vested
in all Legislative bodies to repealalter or amend laws
of a general nature does not give thxrn power to alter and
amend a charter of inco-poration. Th. State,when it iakes
a contr.ct,occupie3 the ame relatioi , to th other con-
tracting party that an individual citizen of the State
occupies in making a contract with another citizen. If it
reserves the power to alter,a contract may be altered,
otherwise not.
It was contended that t1,e charter of th- Church corp-
oration had received th? implied sanction of Congress
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bY th-e act of its inco-l-iuration being allowed to remain
on the Statute Books of the Territory without disapproval,
f'om 1855 to 1887,there being in force during all of said
a law which rxquirr the S-.oretary of ti. Territory to
transmit to the President of tLe Senate and the speaker
of the House of Representativ:-s,for thi use of Congress,
t"11o copies of the laws and journals of each session of
the Territorial Legislature,within thirty days after th'
end of each sessionand ona copy to th2 President of the
United StaLes. After a reasonable time had elapsedCon-
gress could not impair the contract nor dissolve th3
corporation,either b- disaplproving the act of incorpor.-
tionor by repealing the charter. In the case of Clinton
v. Englebrecht, 13 Wal. 446,t;.e courtspeaking of the
jury law applicable to the Territory of Utah,saya:
"In th.. first place we observe that the law has re-
ceived the implied sanction of Congre;s. It was adopte d
in !59. it has b .en on the Statute Book for iaore than
twelve yrars. It must have b en transmitted to Congress
soon after it,was enacte d,for it was tie auty of tie Sec-
retary of the Territory to transmit to that body copi,.,
of all laws on or before the first of thl n, xt D.combor
in each year, The simple disappi'oval by Congress at an-,
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tim could have annulled it@ It is no unreasonable in-
ferrnce therefore that it was approved by that body.'
Conceding that Congress had the power to disapprove
the charter of the Church and dissolve the corporation,
thenunder previous decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United Statesthe property would seem to belong to the
members of the corporation. In the case of Greenwood v
Freight Company, 105 U?S? 199the court,throuigh Mr. Jus-
tien Mill~r, says :
"Personal and real property acquired b- the corpora-
tion during its lawful cxistence,rights of contract or
choses in action so acquired,and which do not in their
nature depnd upon the general polvrs conferred by the
charterare not destroyed bv such repeal;and the court
may,if the Legislature does not provide somr special rem-
edy,enforce" such 'i'ht s by tiie means within their porrer.
Tho rights,of th shareholders of such a corporation to
their interest in its propertv,,are not annihilated bT
such a rep, al,and there must remain in the corts a power
to rrotect t! o~e ri'9.ts."
The lan-uage of 1h, court abov, quotedclearly rcog-
nizo. the right of the members of a dissolved corporation
to its prop 3rty,and,altnough it was use~d 'ith reforenc,;
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to a business corporation,it is difficult to see -711y thi
same principl. should hot apply to reli 7ious and cllari-
table or.-anizations. In .ecit seems repugneit to tne
whole tiheory of our government and to the genius of re-
publican institutions to permit the governument to confis-
cate and sch~at th: prop hrtv of such a dissolved corpo-
rat ion*
This was cl.arly expressed by thi Supreme Court i
the case oi Terrett v. Tvlor 9 Cranch, 50. In many re-
spects this Utah case is very similar to t1hat. Th3 Legis-
latur! of Virginia,b- statute passed in 1798,attempted
to disinco-rorat-e the Episcopal Churches in that Stateby
repealing all statutes pas -d for their benefit previous
to that time,upon the ground that they were inconsistent
with ti-i. principles of tlhe State constitution and of re-
ligious freedom, claiminpi that all the property ac juirce'
by the Episcopal Chiir31.es in ali th2 parishes oL the
State of rir-t belonged to the Stateand directing tie
over _ eers o- th, poo - in each pariDi to sell the property
and appropriate t .e proceeds to the use of the poor of
the parish. In. deliv,'rili the opinion of the Court,Mr.
Justice Story rx,± u!tivvl ~riews the law- r3lating to
such cases,and says:
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"The property was in fact,and in 1aw,gener'lly pur-
chased br the parishoners oi, acquired br tI2 beneficencea
of the pious donor;,and the title there'to was indIefas-
ibly vested in the churche,. x x x A p 'ivate corporation
created by the Legislature may lose its franchises byr a
misuse or nonuse of them, md they may be resumed by the
government by a judicial judgment upon quo warranto to
ascertain and enforce the forfeiture. This is the coflnion
law of the land,and is a taci'. condition annexed to the
creation of every such corporations x x x But t! .-t thle
Legislature can repeal statutes creating private corpora-
tions or confirming to them property already acquired
under the faith of previous laws,and by such repeal can
vest the property of such corporations exclusively in the
State,or dispose of the same to such purposes as they may
please without the consent or cefault of the corporators,
%%e ar2 not prepared to adniit,,and we think ourselves
standing upon the principles of natural justice,upon the
fundamental laws of every free government ,upon the spirit
and letter of the Constitution of the United Statesand
upon the decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals,
in resisting such a doctrine."
It would seem that objection urged against giving
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tile property to th. ni;ers of the churches,that it would
ba used to maintain an illegal }ractice,was not valid,
because t:he property had been contributed for various
religious and charitable uses,and,if one of the use- was
illegal,the court could and should prohibit its use fo,'
that purpoiie and confine the use to purposes that 11ore
strictlr legal. This doctrine is fully and ably discussed
blr the Supreme Court of Massechviusett$ in the case of
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 59;9 Mr. Justice Grey,in
delivering the opinion of tlhe courtsays:
"The intention of the donor is the guide -- in the
phrase of Lord Coke,'The lodastone of the Court',and
therefore,whenever a charitable gift can be administered
accordin to its express directio,,tl is court,like the
court of Chancery in Englandi.3 not at liberty to modify
it upon consideration of policy or convenience. But there
are c-ses wiheie the charitable trust could not be execut-
ed as directed in the will,in which the testator's scheme
has been varied by t'.e court in such a way and to such an
extent as could not be done in tl e ce of a p1iv-?te
trust."
The Mormon Church case was sent back to the Supreme
Court of Utahwith instructions to have the personalty
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that belonged to ti-e church corporation at the tinm of
its dissolution applied to such charitable uses,lawful
in their character,as may most nearly correspond to those
purposes to which ilt was orijinally destined. A master
was appointed to devise such a scheme. The authorities of
the circh asked to have the income arising from the fund
devoted to the support of the poor of the church,and to
the erection and mainten-nce of houses of worship fo- its
members. The government opposed this,scheme on the ground
thatrthese were some of the identical uses for w,hich the
property had been contributedand the order of the court
required that a similar purpose,but not the same purpose,
must b- selected. Upon this theory the master adopted the
scheme propoled b-' the government,and recominended that
the property be given to the public schools of the Terri-
tory. He found as a fact,howeverfrom testimon-r taken,
"that since the rendition of the decree in';thIs casethe
practice of polygamy has been abandoned by the church.
Exceptior's nver, filed to this reportand it is now pend-
ing in the Supreme Court of Utah.
As the property was taken away from the church be-
cause of ths practice of polygamnand that institution
had been abandoned,there would seem to be no good reason
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why it should not be resto-'ed to the lawful uses for
which it was contributed, instead of bini- devoted to a
purpose foreign to the intention of the donorsin which
the public -- those --!ho nev~r contributed anything to the
fund and are not even members of the church -- will be
the beneficiaries.
In conclusion, I quote from the congressional report
of the Committee on Territories of the House-of Repre-
sentativesmade April 1st, 1892,after exhaustive hearings,
as showing present conditions in Utah.
The Committeeafter quoting voluminously from the
testimony taken by it,says: "In the face of such evidence
as this,the witnessesincluding all classes of Gentiles
and Mormonsboth official and unofficial,Gnere can no
longer be a question as to the status of polygamy in the
Territory. That institution has been abolished forever,
and t!e laws relating to it are as strictly obeyed ir
Utah as in anv other Territory or in an, State of the
Union. x x x *
"Your committee is thorou..ly satisfied of Utah's
entire qualification for acmission into the Unionwith
all the powers of full Statehood. x x x . The satisfac-
tion which your committee has expressed iswe think,
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fully justified by, the facts and statistics .:Iiich are ex-
hibitu. in this reportand certainly by the hearings
which took place in the conmmittee roomwhich h3arings
have been printed in full. Utah is shown to be enormously
rich in natural resources,many of which have been greatly
developedbut the most of which lie dormant,avaiting th?
touch of enterprise which needs only the assurance of a
government of the people,br the people,to lay hold of the
\voltL rhich nature has provided. Th people of the Ter-
ritory,on the farms,in the mines,and in the cities and
towns,have,in spite of much repression,mad-e a Strong,
,ealthy,and refined conmmunity,,riich,in all the essentialj
of Ameoricem citizenship,is fairly comparable to any other
community of equal population ,,rithin our border."
This I dJean a just tribute to the flourishing Ter-
ritory and h r loyal citizens.
